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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOHN WAGNER, aka. JACK A.
\VAGNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
12094

EARL C. OLSEN,
Def end ant and Respondent.

RESP·ONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit for the alleged wrongful death of a
3 year old child.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury in May of 1967. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent Olsen.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Olsen seeks affirmance of the lower court decision
in his favor.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Olsen does not agree with Appellant Wagner's statement of the facts. It does not state those facts most
favorable to the verdict. We suggest, instead, the
following:
On November 1, 1964, at approximately 7 :00 p.m.,
Wagner driving his automobile, accompanied by his 3
year old son, saw an automobile behind him go out of
control and turn over (T. 104). He continued some distance down the road, then made a U-turn and returned
to the scene of the accident
194).

er.

He parked his car on the side of the road but extending two feet on the traveled portion of the highway
(T. 113; T.S. 23). A highway patrolman and several
other people were already on the scene. Nevertheless,
Wagner left his 3 year old son alone in the car and went
to the scene of the accident.
Even though there were no serious injuries (T. 11819) and Wagner's assistance was not required (T. 113)
he remained at the scene of the accident for over a quarter of an hour, leaving his son alone in the car (T. 134).
Later, Wagner, still at the scene of the accident,
heard the sound of brakes. Having a premonition that
his son might somehow be involved, he hurried back only
to find that his son had been struck by a passing car
(T. 119).
Olsen, whose car had struck the boy, had been proceeding the same direction as the parked car at well
2

below the 40 mile per hour speed limit (T. 20-21, 41). As
Olsen was passing the parked car, the boy darted onto
the highway from in front of the parked car. Olsen's
car was then only 5 feet away (T. 22). The accident was
unavoidable.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INSTRUCTIONS ON CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WERE PROPER.
The jury was instructed on contributory negligence
in three instructions : 16, 22 and 27.
In Instruction No. 16 the jury was given a standard
definition of contributory negligence.
In Instruction No. 22 the jury was told that vehicular
traffic had the right of way over pedestrians at the
place where the accident occurred and that they could
consider this in judging the reasonableness of the conduct
of the plaintiff in leaving his son alone in a car at that
place.
In Instruction No. 27 the jury was told ,that the
plaintiff had a duty to use reasonable care under the
circumstances in the supervision of his son and that failure to do so would bar a recovery by him.
Plaintiff Wagner complains of Instruction No. 16
upon the ground that there was no negligence on the part
of the plaintiff upon which to base the instruction. He
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is saying, in other words, that the issue of contributory
negligence should not have been submitted to the jury.
There was more than enough evidence to justify submission of the issue of contributory negligence. Wagner
left his 3 year old child alone in an automobile parked
partially on the traveled portion of a main highway (T.
113) 1 in the dark of night (T. 113), to go to the scene
of an accident where them were no serious injuries and
a highway patrolman was already on the scene (T. 118,
119), without really knowing himself what his intent
was in leaving his son alone (T.123).
He remained there for a quarter of an hour (T. 134)
or longer knowing of the traffic conditions on this main
traveled highway (T. 114), ignoring the reasonable expectation that the young boy would become frightened
and leave the car in an attempt to find his father who he
had seen cross the highway.
Wagner could have taken his son with him (T. 118),
but instead, he parked his car where his son, if he left
the car, would of necessity cross four lanes of traffic
to find his father. This was done in spite of the fact
that he could have pulled his car to a point where he
could have observed and determined whether his assistance was needed without even leaving his car ( T. 118).
Safer and easily accessible parking spots were nearby
(T. 112, 122). Wagner, himself, anticipated the danger
because he admitted at trial having wondered at the time,
before the accident, whether he should have left the boy
alone in the car ( T. 119).
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The trial eourt did not err in submitting the issue
of contributory negligence to the jury. It follows from
this that the court did not err in giving its instruction
No. 16 which was merely a definition of contributory
negligence.
Plaintiff Wagner contends that the trial court erred
in charging him with the duty of yielding the right of
way to vehicular traffic when he was in no way involved
in the accident. He misses the thrust of this instruction.
In Instruction No. 22, the jury was told:
''A person in crossing the highway in the
vicinity of this accident was required by law to
yield the right of way to all vehicles on the roadway so near as to constitute an immediate hazard.
You. may consider this only in coninection with
the conduct of the def end amt and the plaintiff."
(R. 23) (Emphasis added.)
This instruction bore upon the conduct of the defendant
and of the conduct of the plaintiff in leaving his 3 year
old son alone in a car parked at the side of a road in an
area ··where vehicular traffic would be entitled to the
right of way. This instruction did not bear upon the
eonduct of the plaintiff in crossing the road or in the
conduct of plaintiff's son in crossing the road.
If there was any chance that the jury would apply
this instruction to the minor child, the court anticipated
that possibility and avoided it by the insertion of the last
sentence. The jury could not more clearly have been made
aware of the inapplicability of instruction No. 22 to the

ehild.
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It is basic to our jurisprudence and jury system that
the jury is presumed to have followed the instructions
given them.
In the recent case of State v. Higgins, 449 P.2d 393
(Wash. 1969) the Washington Supreme Court was called
upon to rule whether the submission of a special interrogatory to the jury had the effect of inviting the jury
to avoid the instructions and in effect allow double recovery. The Washington Supreme Court rejected appellant's contention, stating: ''There is nothing in the
language of the instruction given which implies such an
invitation, and we carvnot presume that the jury misunderstands the plain language of an instruction." Id.
at 397. (Emphasis added.)
In Williams v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co.,
119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 315, 322 (1951) this court said:
''The instructions may not in all regards be
models of clarity, they may not present the legal
principles in the best manner, and ·the sequence in
which they are given may have a tendency to make
them difficult to follow. However, the jurors
were directed to consider them together and we
must a.ssume they followed this direction." (Emphasis added.)
No complaint is made of Instruction No. 27 which
defined plaintiff Wagner's duty for the care and supervision of his son in accordance with Alvarez v. Paulus, 8
Utah 2d 283, 333 P. 2d 633 (1959).
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Indeed, no objection was made at the trial to Instruction No. 16 or Instruction No. 22. The only exceptions
taken were with respect to Instructions Nos. 20, 25 and
30 (T. 145-46).
Plaintiff Wagner asserts error with respect to Instructions Nos. 16 and 22 in this appeal for the first time
contrary to the provisions of Rule 51 which provides that
a party may not assign as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects thereto, and the established law of
this state as set forth in McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d
364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954) and Employers Mut. Liability
Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co. 123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953)
and numerous other decisions.
POINT II
AN INSTRUCTION ON WILLFUL AND
WANTON MISCONDUCT WOULD HAVE
BEEN IMPROPER.
Plaintiff Wagner argues that the trial court should
have instructed the jury that the defense of contributory
negligence would not bar plaintiff's recovery if the jury
found defendant's conduct to be "willful and wanton."
The authorities cited by appellant which he alleges would
support a finding of willful and wanton misconduct on
the part of this def end ant are clearly distinguishable
from the facts of this case.
In the 1894 case cited by Wagner, Esrey v. Southern
Pacific Company, 103 Cal. 541, 37 P.500, the plaintiff was
injured when struck by an extra-wide railroad boxcar
7

while she was standing between the track and the railroad platform. The court stated "[T]here is no question but that the two brakemen, and possibly the engineer and fireman, saw her standing in this position."
In Harrington. v. Los Angeles Ry. Co., 140 Cal. 514,
74 P. 15 (1903), cited by appellant, the deceased plaintiff,
a participant in a bicycle race, cut in front of an electric
street car and was hit. Here again, however, the driver of
the street car knew beforehand that the street car would
cut across the path of the bicycle riders and he had been
warned by "numerous bystanders" that the racers were
coming. Some people had eYen stood in front of the
street car in an attempt to get the motorman to slow
down though he continued on and forced these people
from the track. As the court stated at p.17 " [A]fter
such discovery [of the bicycle riders] he could easily
have stopped his car before it reached the path along
which the bicyclists were proceeding, and thus have in. sured absolute safety to the riders ... ''
In Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Company, 18 Cal.
2d 863, 118 P .2d 465 ( 1941), the court ref used to find
willful and wanton misconduct where a railroad switchman had erroneously thrown a switch the wrong way thus
causing the collision of two trains. The court pointed
out that "a negligent person has no desire to cause the
harm that results from his carelessness. And he must be
distinguished from a person guilty from a person guilty
from willful misconduct, such as assault and battery, who
intends to cause harm." Id. at 468.
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In Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Ore. 130, 295 P.2d 182
(1956) the defendant was operating his automobile within the city of Portland at speeds between 45 and 55
miles per hour. The defendant had testified he saw the
plaintiff in the intersection, and the plaintiff was struck
by defendant's car while it was "straddling the yellow
line." Id. at 191.
In Williams v. Carr, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505
(1968), the defendant had gone to work at 5 :30 in the
morning, had worked all day and then went drinking with
a group of friends until the early hours of the morning.
At the time of the accident he had been awake for 22
hours. He continued to drive even though he was admittedly physically fatigued and had stopped the car
shortly before to help awaken himself. He made no attempt to awaken any of the other passengers in the car
and find someone less fatigued to drive.
In Ferguson v. Jon,gsma, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P.2d
404 (1960), the plaintiff was attempting to arrest the
defendants when they intentionally drove their car towards him and drug him some 200 feet while he was
dangling from the car door with his hands and arms
hanging through the shattered glass. Additionally, the
plaintiff had continually begged the defendant to stop
the car and the defendant had told him "to go to ... "
and continued on until the car went out of control and
struck a power pole.
None of the elements found in the above cases cited
hy plaintiff Wagner are found in our case.
9

Olsen did not see the Wagner boy previous to the
boy darting into his path; Olsen had no way of knowing beforehand the boy would jump out; Olsen was not
driving beyond the speed limit.
Olsen's conduct was not ·willful and wanton and
plaintiff ·wagner made no effort to so convince the court
and jury. The boy leaped into the path of the car when,
according to the most favorable eYidence, there were but
five feet between himself and the car. No choice was
available to Olsen. His striking the boy was completely
unavoidable.
Plaintiff "\Vagner's own authority of Williamis 1).
Carr, GS Cal. Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505 (1958) shows that
the conduct of the defendant could not be classified as
willful or wanton:
'' [W] illful misconduct implies the intentional
doing of something either with knowledge, express or implied, that serious injury is a probable,
as distinguished from a possible result, or the
intentional doing of an act with a wanton or reckless regard of its consequences." Id. at 509.
In any event the Complaint was based upon ordinary
negligence, not willful, wanton misconduct (R. 1). At
pretrial no mention was made about proceeding on a
theory of willful, wanton misconduct.
At trial nothing was said about willful, wanton misconduct. No objection was made to the trial court's failure to so instruct the jury. No request was made to so
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instruct the jury. No mention of this was made in the
Motion for New Trial (R. 39).
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in
issue at the trial can be considered for the first time on
appeal. Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45
(1967).
A party who by his own pleadings, evidence and requested instructions tries and rests his case upon a certain theory is bound by that theory which then becomes
the law of the case and cannot upon appeal shift to
another theory or position. Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah
2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954).
POINT III
THE COURT PROPERLY GAVE INSTRUCTION NO. 20 ON UNAVOIDABLE
ACCIDENT.
Plaintiff alleges reversible error because the trial
court gave an unavoidable accident instruction which
"was not supported by any evidence including defendant's expert." (Appellant's Brief at 11.)
A survey of the cases where an unavoidable accident
instruction was given reveals a criteria to determine
whether such an instruction is proper:
Where the parties to the action are the only persons
whose conduct is involved in the case, the matter can
usually be resolved solely by reference to the conduct of
11

those parties. However, where the accident occurs due
to the intervention of an irresponsible third party or
force, the instruction is proper.
In this case the instruction was proper because the
conduct of the child could reasonably have been found
to have been the cause of the accident, even though not
negligence due to his age. If so, it was unavoidable from
the standpoint of the parties to the suit.
Wagner claims on this appeal there was no evidence
that the accident was unavoidable.
However, at trial Olsen called three witnesses to
establish such evidence: Captain Pitcher, as an accident
reconstruction expert, and Mr. and Mrs. Garcia who were
parked in their automobile near the plaintiff's automobile at the of the accident. The testimony of the Garcias
was basically directed to the speed of the highway traffic
prior to the accident and the length of time which they
were parked behind plaintiff's automobile (a.bout 15
minutes) before the accident occurred ( T. 127-40).
Captain Pitcher, on the other hand, gave rather extensive testimony concerning the physical evidence at
the accident scene. The sole point of his testimony was
that the accident, from Olsen's position, was unavoidable.
This, of course, was the thrust of Olsen's case (T.S.
41-58).
In Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d 210, 436 P.2d
442 (1968), this court specifically rejected the contention
12

that the givmg of an unavoidable accident instruction
is reversible error. At most, an unavoidable accident
instruction is repetitious of instructions which point out
that defendant's negligence must be the proximate cause
of the accident before he can be found liable.
In this case, however, ithe unavoidable instruction
was not repetitious. It was the sole instruction given
which stated affirmatively the defendant's case as presented through its expert witness.
To say that unavoidable accident instruction was
repetitious of other "no causation" instructions, and
thus confusing to the jury in this case, is unrealistic. In
this case Wagner alleged negligence on the part of Olsen
in at least four different ways. We do not believe that
this case could have been fairly presented to the jury in
light of plaintiff's specific affirmative allegations of
negligence simply by instructions which speak abstractly
of proximate cause.
The unavoidable accident instruction was supported
by the evidence and the testimony of defendant's chief
witness. It was the only instruction which affirmatively
stated the defendant's theory of the case. Olsen was entitled to have his theory presented by the instructions.
Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834, 836 (1951).
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POINT IV
THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT
WAS PROPER.
Plaintiff Wagner claims that Captain Pitcher was
allowed to give opinion testimony on facts which he had
assumed and which were otherwise not in evidence. The
record clearly shows this claim to be without foundation.
The hypothetical question of which Wagner complains involved the following facts (T.S. 47):
1. A child of approximately age 4 (3 years, 9
months) ran a distance of 24 feet across a blacktop
highway.
2. The path of the child was directly across the
highway.
3. An automobile was proceeding in a generally
north direction along the roadway in the inside lane of
traffic.
4. The automobile left 40 feet of skid marks before
striking the child.
5. The automobile was traveling at 39 miles per hour
before the brakes were applied.
6. The driver in the automobile had a normal reaction time.
Specifically, appellant alleges that there was no
evidence as to the path of the child (No. 2), the length of
the skid marks before impact (No. 4), the reaction time
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of a normal drive (No. 6), or the exact point of impact.
(Appellant's brief at 13).
All of the facts listed above were in evidence, however. Plaintiff's own witness, Officer LaMar T. Chard,
testified as to the correctness of fact No. 1 - the 24 feet
(TS. 28). The defendant, on plaintiff's own cross-examination, testified as to fact No. 2-the direct path of the
child (T. 39). Fact No. 3 was undisputed. The length
of the skid marks before impact, fact No. 4, was again
acknowledged by plaintiff's own witness, Officer Chard
(TS. 33). The point of impact as being directly across
from plaintiff's own automobile was tes,tified to by the
defendant (T. 28). Fact No. 5, the speed of defendant's
automobile, was also testified to by Officer Chard (TS.
8).
Fact No. 6, the normal reaction time of the average
individual, was offered into evidence by the expert witness himself in response to a question by defense counsel
(TS. 49). It was not offered as the reaction time of Olsen.
Plaintiff made no objection to defendant's witness offering in evidence the reaction time of the average person
(TS. 49). It was proper for Capt. Pitcher to off er this
evidence. ''An expert or skilled witness can give an
opinion upon facts previously testified to by him ... "
Day v. Lorenzo Smith an·d Son, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 221, 408
p .2d 186, 189 ( 1965).
The hypothetical question asked Captain Pitcher was
based upon facts in evidence and was relevant to the
issue of causation.
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POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DE:B-,ENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS.
Plaintiff Wagner claims as his final point that the
trial court committed reversible error when it limited his
cross-examination of Captain Pitcher. As previously explained, the sole purpose of his testimony was to show
that any man placed in the position of Olsen would have
unavoidably struck the Wagner youth. The testimony
dealt with the average man.
On cross-examination plaintiff attempted to question
defendant's \vitness with respect to an intoxicated person
rather than the average sober man. The trial court properly refused to permit this as cross-examination.
The general rule is that cross-examination of a wit. ness may not go beyond the testimony given in direct
examination. This rule is somewhat liberalized with respect to cross-examination of experts. As stated in 32
C.J.S. Evide1'1ice
"Rules governing the cross-examination of
witnesses generally apply, with such modifications as the character of the testimony makes
necessary, to the cross-examination of skilled witnesses and experts.''
We do not challenge the principle that an expert
may be cross-examined to test his good faith, knowledge
and credibility. State v. Christensen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371
P.2d 552 (1962). However, the nature of plaintiff's
16

cross-examination did not go to the good faith, knowledge
or credibility of the witness but was a new line of inquiry
as if the expert were plaintiff's own witness.
The extent to which cross-examination of an expert
can be limited is one of the many areas to which the trial
court must be allowed to exercise its discretion. Because
of the trial judge's unique position he must be allowed
wide discretion with respect to limiting cross-examination. As the Kansas Supreme Court said in Bott v.
Wendler, 203 Kan. 212, 453 P.2d 100, 113 (1969), concerning the cross-examination of an expert witness:
''No rule can be laid down that would determine the extent and limitation of cross-examination allowable in every case. Generally speaking
the matters must rest in the sound discretion of
the judge trying the case.''
Even if the trial court should not have limited crossexamination, this was not reversible error. Any testimony which Wagner desire to elicit could have been
elicited by calling the witness as his own. It was specifically pointed out to counsel for plaintiff that he was
free to call Captain Pitcher as his own witness (T. 57).
Pursuing this, counsel obtained a short recess while he
left the courtroom to confer with Captain Pitcher (T. 58).
But after having been given the opportunity to call Captain Pitcher and confer with him counsel did not do so.
Any evidence the Appellant alleged he was denied by
virtue of the trial court's limiting his cross-examination
was denied him by virtue of his failure to call the witness
as his own.
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And even now, we do not know whether the ruling
was prejudicial. No offer of proof was made. Wagner
should not be permitted to claim reversible error where
no showing was made as to what Captain Pitcher's testimony would have been. An offer of proof is necessary to
save on appeal a point relating to the exclusion of evidence. Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 431 P.2d 719
(1967).
CONCLUSION

The accident which lead to the death of Michael
Wagner was unavoidable. Both parties had every opportunity to fully develop their case and present their
evidence. The jury was fairly and correctly instructed
and the matter placed in their hands. Their verdict for
the defendant, no cause of action, was supported by substantial evidence. Appellant has presented this court
with nothing indicating the jury acted otherwise than
honestly, without bias and in accordance with the in- '
structions given them.
The jury verdict should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN AND
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Re.spondent
7th Floor, Continental
Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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